Third-party cell captives as an enabler for transformation in the insurance sector

Stakeholder workshop
23 May 2018, Johannesburg
About us

• Independent think tank
• Inclusive insurance work in SA and globally
• Catalyse dialogue through research
  - Focus on the issues and trends, rather than legal technical details
  - Balanced view
Why this study?
Transformation is about more than just ownership

Ownership and management
Skills development
Enterprise development & procurement
Access, take-up, and usage of financial services
Empowerment financing

Who is involved? Who do they serve? How do they operate?

Why this study?
Insurance transformation progress

FSC Actual relative to target

Life offices
- Black ownership: ↑
- Management control: ↓
- Access to financial services: ↓

Short-term insurers
- Skills development: ↑
- Procurement: ↑

Insurance uptake across population groups

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Towards a new compact

Progress... but more needs to be done

- Insurance Act ups the ante
- 2018 Financial Sector Summit
- **Role for 3rd party cell captives?**
  - As part of bigger picture
  - Benefits?
  - Issues?

What are the issues?
Regulatory changes introduced further to 2013 Discussion Paper proposals

Licensing:
- Dedicated licence, 1st and 3rd party split
- No more similar arrangements

Governance and operational requirements:
- Licensing conditions to be amended
- Prescribing provisions in SPAs

Market conduct:
- Enhanced disclosure
- Restrictions on “white labelling”
- Insurer accountable for market conduct

Reporting at cell level:
- Info request 5/2016

Prudential:
- Insurer accountable for soundness
- MCR R1m per cell, no “rent-a-cell”
What are the issues?

Remaining regulatory questions

Licensing:
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Who may be a cell owner?

What products may affinity cells provide?

Is R1m feasible upfront for all cells and how may a cell be capitalised?
About the study

Study objectives:
• Framework
• Transformation role
• Dialogue

Method
• Desktop research and regulatory review
• >30 interviews
Presentation outline

• The cell captive structure
• The cell captive landscape
• Why go the cell route?
• Are cell captives a vehicle for transformation?
• How to unlock the true transformation potential?
The cell captive structure
What is a cell captive and how does it operate?

Other potential players/outsoured functions:
- UM/NMI binder agreement
- Administration agreements
- Agreements with brokers or other intermediaries

Cell owner
- Idea, product, market
- Binder functions

Cell captive insurer
- Licensed to issue third-party cells

Cell account
- Capitalisation of cell account, purchase of class of shares

Services provided by the cell captive insurer:
- Governance and compliance (guidance, oversight and regular review)
- Actuarial services
- Product design, policy wording and pricing
- Underwriting

Reinsurer
What is a cell captive and how does it operate?

**Cell owner**
- Idea, product, market
- Binder functions

**Balance sheet:**
- Capital in
- Dividends out

**Cell captive insurer**
- Licensed to issue third-party cells
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  - Governance and compliance (guidance, oversight and regular review)
  - Actuarial services
  - Product design, policy wording and pricing
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  - Capitalisation of cell account, purchase of class of shares

**Income statement: possible outflows**
- Administration fees payable to TPA
- Binder fees payable to binder holders
- Reinsurance premiums paid to reinsurer
- Claims paid to customers
- Management fees paid to cell captive insurer
- Where binder holder is UM – can be paid profit share in terms of binder agreement

**Income statement: possible inflows**
- Premiums from policyholders received via administrator/binder holder/intermediaries
- Reinsurance payments received from reinsurer
- Investment income earned on capital investment

**Other potential players/outsourced functions:**
- UM/NMI binder agreement
- Administration agreements
- Agreements with brokers or other intermediaries
What is required to be a cell owner
Capital & other requirements

**Cell Owner Capital Required**

**Minimum Statutory Capital:**
R1m – must be own capital

**Solvency Capital:**
Determined by insurer – only 15% of insurer’s own solvency capital may be taken into account (draft prudential standards)

**Operational capital:**
For start-up add additional infrastructure/operational capital – from interviews conducted this could range from a minimum R5m – R6m

**Cell Captive Insurer Requirements**

**Due diligence:**
Legal entity structure; financials; risk management – governance & compliance

**Value proposition:**
Idea/product/market; cost; expected claims ratio

**Distribution method:**
Insurtech/social media/call centre/intermediaries
Operational requirements: IT infrastructure; automation; value chain service providers

Source: various regulations and acts, stakeholder interviews
The role of reinsurers in the cell environment
Reinsurers a “market maker” and strategic player in the cell environment

Other potential players/outsourced functions:
• UMA/binder agreement
• Administration agreements
• Agreements with brokers or other intermediaries

Cell owner
Idea, product, market

Cell account
Capitalisation of cell account, purchase of class of shares

Cell captive insurer
Cell captive insurer licensed to issue third-party cells

Reinsurer
Reinsurance in respect of each cell

Services:
• Governance
• Compliance (guidance, oversight and regular review)
• Actuarial services
• Product design, policy wording and pricing
• Underwriting

Specialist support
The financing of the cell business venture
Sources of risk and operational capital

**Risk capital**

1. Cell owner’s own capital ("skin in the game")
2. Allowance by cell insurers to build capital over time: “rent-a-cell”

**Operational capital**

1. Cell owner’s own capital
2. Equity stake in cell owner provided to service provider partner or another
3. Obtain venture capital: Insurer and/or reinsurer investment company arms, also more general venture capital companies
The cell captive landscape
## The cell captive landscape

### The cell provider landscape

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<th>Long-term insurers</th>
<th>Short-term insurers</th>
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<td>1. Absa Life Limited</td>
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<td>5. Guardrisk Life Limited</td>
<td>5. Regent Insurance Company Limited</td>
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<td>6. Momentum Ability Limited</td>
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<td>7. Old Mutual Alternative Risk Transfer Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Regent Life Assurance Company Limited</td>
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Source: List supplied by FSB (2018)
The cell captive landscape
Number and types of cells

Largest cell captive insurers: 1st vs. 3rd party

- 3rd party: 71%
- 1st party: 21%
- Combined: 8%

> n ≈ 300

Largest cell captive insurers: LT vs. ST

- Non-Life: 67%
- Life: 33%

> n ≈ 300

Source: Cell insurers, FSB Paper (2013)
The cell captive landscape

Products provided

**Short-term insurance**
- Property: 34.3%
- Motor: 16.7%
- Accident & health: 7.8%
- Liability: 7.5%
- Miscellaneous: 4.9%
- Guarantee: 11.1%
- Transport: 12.1%
- Engineering: 21%

**Long-term insurance**
- Life: 74.4%
- Health: 6.3%
- Assistance: 2.6%
- Disability: 19%

Source: FSB quarterly report September 2017
From interviews, following main product types identified:

- **Funeral** (individual, assistance business or life)
- **Credit life**
- Life cover packaged as **dread disease** only covering cancer
- **Funeral sold as group schemes** – sold to retailers, churches and undertakers (life policy)
- **Corporate asset/short-term insurance**: Engineering, aviation, renewable energy

### Short-term insurance
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- Motor: 21%
- Accident & health: 12.1%
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- Miscellaneous: 7.8%
- Guarantee: 7.5%
- Transport: 4.9%
- Engineering: 1.3%

### Long-term insurance
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- Assistance: 6.3%
- Disability: 2.6%
The cell captive landscape: cell arrangement categories

Four main types

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<th>Cell owner is binder holder</th>
<th>Underwriting Manager cell (UM)</th>
<th>Affinity cell (NMI)</th>
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<th>Silent Partner cell</th>
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<th>Affinity relationship with clients</th>
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<th>Affinity cell (NMI)</th>
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Source: Own analysis
The cell captive landscape: types of cell structures

Type A: The cell owner as **underwriting manager (UM)**

- The cell owner is the FSP and also binder holder (UM)
- The UM may not sell directly to customers – intermediaries appointed
- Intermediary markets and sells the products; receives commission via cell structure
- UM receives binder fee from the cell captive insurer; may be paid a dividend from the cell and may share in underwriting profits

Cell captive insurer
- Capital contractually ring-fenced
- Payments are made from cell account

Intermediaries:
- independent or tied

Also the **Underwriting Manager**

Fees/dividends/profit share

Capital
The cell captive landscape: types of cell structures

Type B: The affinity cell – cell owner as non-mandated intermediary (NMI)

- The cell owner FSP is classified as a non-mandated intermediary (NMI); also the binder holder – could e.g. be retailer
- Underlying affinity group
- NMI receives a binder fee from cell captive insurer; may be paid a dividend from the cell
- If the NMI is also authorised to market and sell the products, it receives remuneration from cell captive insurer

Cell owner
(SPA with Cell Captive Insurer)
AND
Appointed as Binder Holder (NMI)

Cell captive insurer
Capital contractually ring-fenced
Payments are made from cell account

Intermediaries
could (or could not) be appointed

Own analysis, based on stakeholder interviews
The cell captive landscape: types of cell structures

Type C: The cell owner as non-mandated intermediary (NMI)

- Cell owner FSP is classified as NMI; also binder holder
- Cell owner has value proposition and distribution model to market products to identified market e.g. people under debt review, domestic workers, small businesses
- Cell established to create its own pool of clients over time
- Cell owner does not meet “affinity” criterion per the 2013 regulatory proposals – at risk of being disallowed

Cell owner
(SPA with Cell Captive Insurer)
AND
Appointed as Binder Holder (NMI)

Capital

Cell captive insurer
Capital contractually ring-fenced
Payments are made from cell account

Fees/dividends/profit share

Underwriting manager

Intermediaries could (or could not) be appointed

Own analysis, based on stakeholder interviews
The cell captive landscape: types of cell structures

Type D: The **silent partner** cell owner

- Cell owner does not perform any outsourced functions (i.e. is not a binder holder or administrator).
- Cell owner provides the capital to set up the cell and ensures solvency of the cell.
- According to 2013 regulatory proposals, this type of cell is at risk of being disallowed.

**Cell owner**
- Provides capital to set up the cell
- Facilitates the creation and maintenance of the cell structure

**Cell captive insurer**
- Capital ring-fenced by insurer
- Payments to cell owner and third-party service providers made from cell account

- Fees and other payments

**Binder holder and administration entity**

**Intermediary**

Own analysis, based on stakeholder interviews
Why go the cell route?
One of a number of options for insurance provision
One of a number of options for insurance provision

- FSP or binder holder
  - Intermediary or underwriting services only, underwriting by insurer
  - Earns fees, can profit-share
  - FSP compliance only, no capital
  - BUT: limited scope to tailor offering to own client base

- MI cell owner

- Cell owner

- Microinsurer

- Insurer
One of a number of options for insurance provision

- Limited range of products in line with MI restrictions
- Microinsurer ensures compliance
- R250k capital
One of a number of options for insurance provision

- **FSP or binder holder**
- **MI cell owner**
- **Cell owner**
- **Microinsurer**
- **Insurer**

- No prescribed corporate structure
- Full range of products of cell captive insurer
- Insurer ensures compliance
- R1m capital
One of a number of options for insurance provision

- FSP or binder holder
- MI cell owner
- Cell owner
- Microinsurer
- Insurer

- Product limits
- Proportionate regulatory framework
- R4m capital
One of a number of options for insurance provision

- Full compliance, autonomy, range or products as per licence
- R15m capital
Why establish a cell?
The cell owner perspective

**Autonomy**
- Design innovative products, relevant to target market
- Control of value chain
- Focus on aspects of insurance business they are good at (e.g. underwriting)

**Nimbleness**
- Own IT infrastructure
- Shorter value chain vs traditional insurer value chain
- Gets closer to customers
- Automated processes – easier decision-making than traditional corporate world

**Share in economic benefits**
- Cell owner may feel they “own” client group and/or brand
- Cost savings contributing to surplus build-up
- Ability to share profits with communities

**Compliance and support**
- Lower capital requirements
- Less onerous to set up cell
- Insurer oversees regulatory compliance, regular reviews
- Access to insurance expertise, e.g. actuarial and legal

Source: stakeholder interviews
Cell-owner-controlled value chain

Advantages for customers and the cell owner

**Advantages of customers:** niche offerings, accessible and tailored insurance, simplified policy wording

**Advantages for cell owner:** control over costs and quality, automated processes, data analysis. Essentially less legacy system constraints.

Source: Stakeholder interviews
Insurtech, cost-effectiveness and competition

New technology developments attract new types of entrants to the insurance space

Direct effect: New ideas and innovative use of technology (e.g. chatbots, smartphone-based client interaction) lowers costs for client

Indirect effect: Over time, greater competition in market due to more entrants – lowers costs to client - possibly the most important channel through which costs are lowered
The potential cell graduation path

- In principle: stepping stone to a full insurance licence
- But cell may also be the destination
Are cell captives a vehicle for transformation?
# Are cells contributing to transformation?

## An indicative classification

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<th>Capacity development</th>
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- **Black owned and managed**
- **Transformative in its capacitation and FI role**
- **Transformative largely via FI focus**
- **No explicit transformation**
Ownership and economic participation

Transformation through ownership is a long game

- Limited progress in transforming ownership in the insurance market
- Direct ownership in the traditional sector requires large capital investment
- **Cell captives provide an opportunity for black entrepreneurs and small black business to participate in the economic benefits of the insurance market**

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Source: Adapted from SAIA (2017), ASISA (2017)
Management control and employment equity
Limited transformation at middle to upper management

- Limited progress in transforming management in the insurance market
- Notably, senior and middle management far below FSC targets
- Black entrepreneurs oftentimes leave traditional insurers in pursuit of greater management control along the cell value chain
- **Cell captives provide an opportunity for management to be transformed outside of the prevailing corporate culture of the traditional insurance sector**

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Skills development
Promoting entry into insurance markets

- It is not an insubstantial process to become a cell
- Mentorship and support can aid *incubation into* cell structure, as well as *from cell to insurer*
- Coordinated initiatives between industry and organisations like SETA could support skills development.
- Cell captives provide a unique opportunity for capacity development and skills transfer
Enterprise and supplier development

Strengthening the supply chain

- Industry has taken initiative in strengthening supply chains
- Small black businesses and other enterprise development beneficiaries receive financial and non-financial support from industry associations, ASISA and SAIA
- Cell owners and underwriting managers can advance the formalisation of MSMEs
- Cells have potential to support procurement from local suppliers or providers of outsourced services in the value chain that are black-owned, and contribute to employment creation
Access to financial services
A business case for financial inclusion

- Broad-based target markets present untapped market opportunities
- Low-income target markets and less sophisticated consumers can access affordable, tailored products
- Technology and innovation, driven by cell captives, play an important role in delivering affordable products, simplifying processes and encouraging competition
What can be done to unlock the full transformation potential?
Cells and transformation

- Cells are a vehicle to expand direct ownership and diversity of players with autonomy in terms of product design and ability to share in the economic benefits in the insurance market.

- BUT, the cell captive is not a panacea – it requires high levels of business acumen and capacity, and not ALL cells are transformed.

Cells, capacity-building and growth

- Owning and operating a cell is often the end-goal and not just a stepping stone to full licence.

- The transformation potential is not only about incubation to a full insurance licence; equally important is capacitation/incubation into cell ownership.
Findings

Cells and formalisation

• Cells play an important capacitation role vis-à-vis the community facing organisations/affinities that they deal with to get them to FSP status and bring them into the formal insurance space

  - E.g. assisting funeral parlours with FAIS compliance and providing legally underwritten policies

• Or may be a formalisation destination itself

• (For those who want to come into the net)
Remaining questions:
Risk capital

• R1m MCR
  - Current market: cell owners often enter with very low minimum risk capital
  - The move to R1m minimum capital is not questioned – cell owners must have skin in the game

• The initial capital investment of R1m minimum must be the cell owner’s own
  - Current market: the insurer often capitalises the cell initially for which the cell pays a fee and only starts to draw dividends when it has built up its own capital base.
  - What if an organisation cannot raise the full R1m upfront?

• Suggestion for discussion:
  - Allow the R1m to be met in instalments, as long as the actual capital needed to support the business does not exceed the instalments to date?
  - Or allow cell captive insurer to “frontload” the capitalisation?
Remaining questions:
Who may be a cell owner? Conflicts of interest

Cell captive insurer

Cell account

Dividends

Binder fees and commission

Cell Owner
NMI sells products

Premiums

Cell owner acts as agent of the insured and of the insurer → potential conflict
Remaining questions:
Who may be a cell owner? Conflicts of interest

What if business plan demonstrates:
• Cost savings, innovative, relevant and inclusive products
• Financial education

Mitigation of conflicts of interest:
• NMI does not purport to be independent and relationship with cell structure disclosed
• All remuneration (incl. dividend) disclosed
• *Full market conduct framework applies*

Suggestions for debate:
• Allow NMIs to offer insurance as cells even though they are non-affinities if certain requirements to mitigate conflicts or interest are met?
• Or entirely do away with the definition of affinity for cell ownership purposes?
Remaining questions:
What products may be sold?

- Regulatory proposal: products related to underlying business of affinity
- Precedent of products not related to underlying affinity through the retailer distribution model
  - Does it make a material difference whether the retailer is a cell owner?
- The affinity does not state that it is providing competitive product offerings: it is simply a (white-labelled) channel for the products provided via the cell

Suggestion for debate:
- Don’t limit product offering; rather rely on protection of market conduct framework
What can industry do?

- Ongoing mentoring/capacitation already provided by cell captive insurers as part of cell arrangements (though not all have the same hands-on role or appetite for capacity-building of cells)

- What can cell captive insurers and industry associations contribute as a proposal for institutionalising the potentially transformative role of cells into a substantive contribution towards industry-wide transformation commitments?
  - Can a central fund for cell captive financing be created?
  - Incubation plan?
About Cenfri
The Centre for Financial Regulation & Inclusion (Cenfri) is a global think tank and non-profit enterprise that bridges the gap between insights and impact in the financial sector. Cenfri's people are driven by a vision of a world where all people live their financial lives optimally to enhance welfare and grow the economy. Its core focus is on generating insights that can inform policymakers, market players and donors seeking to unlock development outcomes through inclusive financial services and the financial sector more broadly.

Thank you

Please engage with us:

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